

Where is Mi Hazánk?

Geographic dispersion of Mi Hazánk's base – a comparative study

ANALYSIS BY REPUBLIKON INSTITUTE




2022. ÁPRILIS

INTRODUCTION

On April 3rd, what surprised analysts was not simply the two-thirds victory of Fidesz-KDNP, or the weak showing on United for Hungary, but the fact that the Mi Hazánk Movement got into the Parliament. Not many were expecting it. Having received 5,88% of the vote, they gained 6 seats in Parliament, thus – locked head-to-head with Párbeszéd –, they form the seventh largest faction, larger than LMP. The newest analysis from Republikon Institute is seeking answers to these surprising developments, utilizing different methods to get to the bottom of what could have caused the strong showing of Mi Hazánk.

MI HAZÁNK'S NATIONAL PERFORMANCE

Mi Hazánk's share of the national vote has been 5,88%, but we cannot say it has the same support nationwide in every voting district. Looking at the counties and the capital, their worst showing – as expected – has been in Budapest, gaining 4,18%. We see that the radical right still has the strongest support in rural areas: László Toroczkai's party had their strongest showings in Békés (7,73%) and Nógrád (7,71%) counties.




1. ábra Mi Hazánk's county-wide results in 2022

In the capital, we can find the district with their worst results as well, with 2,22% in Budapest's 3rd Voting district, (combining the XII. District with parts of the II. District), where a tight race formed


between Hajnal Miklós (EM) and Fürjes Balázs (Fidesz-KDNP), and where the president of Kátfarkú Kutypárt launched his bid. Even their best results in the capital, 5,61% in the 17th voting district falls behind their national average.

Outside the capital they gained 6,12% of the national vote, but their strongest showings came in the Lowlands and Northern regions of the country (Bács-Kiskun 5. – 9,6%, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 4. – 8,9%). Interestingly, the district of László Toroczkai – Csongrád-Csanád 2nd – was only the 12th most successful district for the party, explained by the nature of the district, as it encompasses half of Szeged as well.



2. ábra: Mi Hazánk's performance by district, 2022

Aside from the geographic factors, it is worth looking at the towns and villages themselves. We have seen in previous elections, as well as in 2022, that people vote in different ways according to where they live, and while larger cities are characteristically left-wing, the smaller towns favor the right. Looking at the voters of Mi Hazánk, we see that one third of them come from villages, another third in towns, and only their last third share county centers or the capital. It is, then unequivocally true that the smaller towns and the villages were where Toroczkai's party did best. It is worth noting, however, that more than 10% of the party's voters are from the capital, which, while not seeming much, nevertheless shows the strength of Mi Hazánk's base in the city, and disproves the notion that they can only gain voters in villages.



3. ábra Mi hazánk's voters based on the type of settlement


MI HAZÁNK'S SUCCESS CONTRASTED TO OTHER, SIMILAR PARTIES

The central question of our analysis is where the party's voters had come from. To find an answer, we contrasted the national results of Mi Hazánk with Jobbik's national results in 2018, and the results achieved by MIÉP-FkgP in 1998. In the case of the former, we compare the results of the voting districts while in the latter (due to the changes in the voting laws) we will look at county-wide results. We analyzed how the different parties results changed in comparison to the results achieved by Mi Hazánk on a per-district level. The higher the number in the positive, the more of a connection there is between two parties, while the higher it is in the negative, the less of a connection there is. (4. Ábra)


	FKgP 1998	MIÉP 1998	Jobbik 2018
Mi Hazánk 2022	0,465	-0,395	0,569

4. ábra: Correlation between the results of Mi Hazánk and other parties

The spreadsheet shows us that the voting base of Mi Hazánk is set differently on a county-level than that of MIÉP in 1998. The correlation and the map also tells of how, while MIÉP was strongest in Budapest and surrounding districts, Mi Hazánk had its weakest showing here. In contrast, we can see a larger connection between the bases of the Független Kisgazdapárt and that of Toroczkai's party. We can see that in the counties where the FkgP used to be strong in 1998, as (Bács-Kiskun 5. – 9,6%, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok 4. – 8,9%), or Békés (20,4%), there Mi Hazánk also had a strong showing during the election (6,74%, 7,66%, 7,73%, respectively).




5. ábra: FKGB (1998) and Mi Hazánk (2022) county-wide results




6. ábra: MIÉP (1998) and Mi Hazánk (2022) county-wide results

We have also examined individual counties, and how much the party's results differ from the national average. If a county's results are lower than 100%, there in that county the party did worse than their national average. Similarly to the previous results, we have seen that the FkgP and Mi Hazánk had similar strong and weak counties, while there was a much larger difference in the case of MIÉP. It is also visible that, when contrasted to MIÉP, Mi Hazánk and FkgP achieved much steadier results in the counties. István Csurka's party was strong in Budapest (196,6%) and Pest county (173,91%) but were considerably weaker elsewhere. Their worst showing was in Szabolcs, where they could only gain half the number of votes as their national average.

Meanwhile both FkgP and Toroczkai's party had their worst results in Budapest (61,06% and 63,14%) while their strongest district was in Békés (145,34% for the former, while the latter had 116,94%). This means they had steadier results in the counties.




7. ábra FKGP (1998) and MI Hazánk (2022) county-wide results and their drift from the national average



6. ábra: MIÉP (1998) and MI Hazánk (2022) county-wide results and their drift from the national average

Based on the 2018 results, we can say that there is correlation between the results of Jobbik in 2018, and the results of MI hazánk is 2022, meaning a portion of Toroczka László's supporters come from amongst supporters of his old party. The 0,57 correlative shows the strong connection between Jobbik's 2018 and MI Hazánk's 2022 voting base on the district-level.



7. ábra: Jobbik (2018) and Mi Hazánk (2022) results by districts

SUMMARY

The voting data tells us that the political roots of Mi Hazánk are incredibly complicated. While it considers Csurka István a forerunner, their voting base shows more similarities with that of FkgP, rather than with MIÉP. This means that the populist messages, flavored by county-interests can be more meaningful to them, than antisemitic messages. This can be seen in their legislative proposals so far as well – like land reform. It is questionable, however, how much of Torgyán’s legacy can Toroczkai inherit: for we know that the programs were not enough, and the party required its leader’s personality and charisma for its success. This kind of cult of personality have not yet been shown around Toroczkai, albeit his new role in the Parliament gives him a strong forum to build his image.

The correlation with Jobbik was not unexpected, as the very foundation of Mi Hazánk in 2019 was politicians who left Jobbik, and thus built on the voters the party had before 2018. The cause of the split was Jobbik’s move of moderation and abandonment of its more radical rhetoric, and thus we can suspect Toroczkai’s base is made up of Jobbik voters more inclined towards this radical rhetoric. In the Parliament we can already see this – beyond the usual government-opposition divide – this conflict between right and radical right. The great question of the coming years is whether Fidesz continues moving to the right, in an attempt to gain the voters of Mi Hazánk, or moves back towards the center, re-establishing its Central Position.

Another great question is how the potential integration of the opposition affects the radical party. A good indicator of this will be the 2024 EU elections, where Mi Hazánk could stand a chance at crossing the threshold, as, traditionally, parties who take strong positions tend to do well – regardless if they stand with or against the Union.



Co-funded by the
Europe for Citizens Programme
of the European Union

A Republikon működését 2018-22 között az Európai Unió „Europe for Citizens” programja támogatja.