

# Easy come, easy go

*The appearance of Mi Hazánk and the Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Party at the 2024 elections and lessons learned*



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## SUMMARY

- In our analysis, based on the election data of the National Election Office and previous opinion polls of the Republikon Institute, we examined the election results of the Mi Hazánk and the Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Party, with special attention to the impact of the emergence of the Tisza Party on the parties' performance.
- The election results seem to confirm a phenomenon that opinion polls have already revealed, according to which the Mi Hazánk and MKKP potential voters could have been leaked to the Tisza Party: support for the two parties plummeted with the emergence of Péter Magyar, and a comparison of votes cast for the county lists and votes cast in counties in the European Parliament makes it even clearer that the two parties performed much worse in elections where Tisza was on the ballot paper.
- At the same time, Mi Hazánk and MKKP are the only parties among the parties running in 2019 and 2024 that were able to improve their results compared to five years ago, and even improved their results compared to their 2022 parliamentary elections results. The "Peter Magyar phenomenon" drain effect has shown the percentage of the parties' core voters, and Mi Hazánk and MKKP can consider it a positive sign that these groups have increased, even if only slightly, over the past two years.
- Although the Tisza Party can now celebrate its European Parliament election results and can indeed look back on an unprecedented success story, looking ahead to 2026, an important lesson for Péter Magyar is that support generated by insufficiently engaged voters can be deceptive and can easily disappear.

The soaring popularity of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party in opinion polls in the run-up to the 9 June European Parliament and local elections made it common knowledge among analysts that the emergence of the new force could fundamentally upset the balance of political power in Hungary. Numerous studies (including by the Republikon Institute) have been published on where the newcomer Tisza's voters come from in the largest numbers, and although the unprecedented public turbulence and the unexpectedly intense campaign the actors who were the biggest losers of the "Peter Magyar phenomenon" changed almost from day to day, there was no doubt that no party's voter base could remain untouched.

If we compare the 2019 and 2024 European Parliament election results of the parties and party alliances that stood both this year and 5 years ago, in most cases we see a spectacular decline.

NATIONAL RESULTS FOR PARTIES AND PARTY ALLIANCES RUNNING IN BOTH THE 2019 AND 2024 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS			
	2019 EP election results	2024 EP election results	Difference (percentage points)
Fidesz-KDNP	52,56%	44,81%	-7,75
DK-MSZP-Párbeszéd*	22,66%	8,04%	-14,62
Mi Hazánk	3,29%	6,71%	+3,42
Momentum	9,93%	3,7%	-6,23
MKKP	2,62%	3,59%	+0,97
Jobbik	6,34%	0,99%	-5,35
LMP	2,18%	0,87%	-1,31

\*The Demokratikus Koalíció and the MSZP-Párbeszéd alliance ran separately in the 2019 European Parliament elections, but have a joint list for 2024. For the purpose of comparability, the results of DK and MSZP-Párbeszéd in 2019 are combined in the table above.

Two parties, however, have managed to achieve better results than five years ago: the Mi Hazánk and the Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Party (MKKP). Although these are two formations with very different characters, it is no coincidence that these two have followed a different path from the other parties since the last European elections. Both Mi Hazánk and the MKKP can be described as so-called "anti-establishment" parties, i.e. in some respects they challenge the entire political establishment or some of its characteristic elements. Mi Hazánk does this through its extreme right-wing, homophobic, racist and xenophobic manifestations, as well as through its messages questioning broader social consensus, such as its opposition to vaccination (although the Fidesz-KDNP's shift to the right is blurring the line between the two parties in more and more areas), while the MKKP, for all its seriousness, still has the character of a joke party in many of its elements and stands out spectacularly from the opposition parties in terms of its communication.

The 2022 parliamentary elections brought another two-thirds parliamentary majority for Fidesz-KDNP, against all preliminary expectations of the opposition, and the united opposition (DK-Jobbik-LMP-Momentum-MSZP-Párbeszéd) suffered a huge defeat, the effects of which are still dominant in Hungarian politics, as they contributed directly and indirectly to the disappointing performance of the parties of the two-year old cooperation in this year's elections. However, Mi Hazánk surprised the public in 2022 by exceeding the 5% threshold for entering parliament with 5.88% of the vote and forming a fraction in the new parliament. The success had its consequences: the show of strength was able to increase the electorate of Mi Hazánk, with the Republikon Institute measuring the party at 10 percent of party voters in October 2022. This level of support wavered a little in 2023, but by August 2023 the party had stabilised at around 9-10%, and remained at this level until March 2024, when Péter Magyar burst into Hungarian politics. After that, the party's popularity declined significantly, falling to around 6 percent in April, lower than at any time since the autumn of 2022.




The performance of Mi Hazánk in the 2024 European elections (6.71%) is very close to the result of László Toroczkai's party in our April survey (6%). At this point, however, it is worth examining why Mi Hazánk did not experience a further decline in support in the two months preceding the elections, similar to the ones in March and April.

Opinion polls have already indicated, and election results have confirmed, that there is a significant willingness of Mi Hazánk supporters to switch to the Tisza Party (the "significant" here is of course relative: since the Tisza Party's support is much higher than that of Mi Hazánk, the former Mi Hazánk voters make up a much smaller percentage of Péter Magyar's voters than the percentage of losses caused by the same voters who migrate to Mi Hazánk). One of the best indicators of this is to compare the number of votes cast for the Mi Hazánk list in the counties in the European elections with the number of votes that the party's county lists received. Since the Tisza Party did not have county lists, the votes were split: Péter Magyar's voters voted for other parties' lists in the local elections, and Mi Hazánk was the obvious beneficiary of this.



\*Since residents of cities with county status are not allowed to vote for the lists of counties, the number of votes cast in cities with county status has been deducted from the number of votes cast for the European Parliament list.

Here it is worth recalling a sentence from our April party preference survey, which was reaffirmed by the election results: 'Péter Magyar was able to get voters from Mi Hazánk, but as a far-right party, Péter Magyar's more moderate policy offer is not an alternative for his core voters'. So this is the answer to the question of why Mi Hazánk's popularity did not fall further between the April survey and the elections: although Tisza was able to siphon off a significant proportion of the party's supporters, these voters were not among the convinced voters of Toroczkai's party. The core of Mi Hazánk is made up of the approximately 6% of voters who had already voted for the party in the 2022 parliamentary elections and whom Péter Magyar was unable to sway.



\*As residents of cities with county status are not allowed to vote for the county lists, the number of votes cast in Székesfehérvár and Dunaújváros was deducted from the number of votes received for the European Parliament list.

In the case of MKKP, we cannot make a county-wide comparison between the number of votes cast for the county lists and the number of votes cast for the EP lists in the counties, as in the case of Mi Hazánk, because the Kutya Party only had a list in Fejér county. In the case of that one list, however, the result is the same as for the lists of Mi Hazánk: the MKKP did blatantly better in the race in which the Tisza Party did not stand.

If we look at the evolution of the MKKP's support since autumn 2022, we can see that the Kutya Party can be considered the biggest winner in 2023: its support among party voters increased from 2% to 8%, and was still at that level in February 2024 - and then came Péter Magyar. The MKKP saw a 3 percentage point decline in the space of a month, and although the April poll showed a minimal (well within the margin of error) recovery, the party's 3.59% European Parliament election result clearly shows that the voter drain did not stop in April, but continued right up to the elections.



The growth of the MKKP, unlike Mi Hazánk, is not the result of its success in the 2022 parliamentary elections, as two years ago the party achieved only 3.27% and failed to enter the parliament. Rather, the reason for the Kutya Party's rise is the spectacular failure of the united opposition, which resulted in a large number of voters who had previously voted for the joint opposition parties ending up with the MKKP. However, the results of this year's European Parliament elections suggest that these voters have now left the party in favour of Tisza, and the Kutya Party's 3.59% result is very close to the result of the 2022 parliamentary elections, as was the case with Mi Hazánk, so it seems that while Mi Hazánk's core voter base is around 6%, the Kutya Party can count on 3-3.5% of committed voters.

Two interesting and closely related conclusions can be drawn from the above. The first is that both Mi Hazánk and the MKKP are in a very ambivalent position when it comes to

assessing the outcome of this year's elections from their own perspective. On the one hand, both parties outperformed in both the 2019 European Parliament and the 2022 parliamentary elections (even if only marginally), but on the other hand, they underperformed by far compared to the expectations that the opinion polls of the months before Peter's emergence might have raised in both them and their supporters. While this year's election results showed that the support measured in the first months of 2023 and 2024 was largely a mirage, with a significant percentage of voters turning away from Mi Hazánk and the MKKP as soon as a more potent political force appeared on the scene, however, compared to the former united opposition parties, they can still claim as an achievement the fact that they were able to at least retain the voters who had supported them in previous elections, and even increase their support marginally.

The other related lesson for Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party may be important for 2026: the example of Mi Hazánk and the MKKP shows that easy supporters are easy to lose. As far as Tisza is involved, we do not yet know how large the core group of voters might be that would stick with the party in the event of a possible weakening or the emergence of another political formation that looks strong, but since it is a new party without a clear ideology and worldview, it is easy to conclude that we cannot speak of such a committed group of supporters for the time being. There are, of course, many differences between the Tisza Party and Mi Hazánk and the MKKP, but there is also a significant similarity: Péter Magyar's party can also be considered an "anti-establishment" party, since - at least according to its communication - it aims to completely restructure the Hungarian political system that has dominated the last two decades or so. This may certainly appeal to many voters who have been critical of the system or who support other parties that are somehow outside it, but the examples of Mi Hazánk and MKKP show that the high support generated by insufficiently committed voters can easily be lost.