

The murmurs of battle during the final stretch

Opinions on the war in the final stretch of the
voting campaign

AN ANALYSIS BY REPUBLIKON INSTITUTE

2026. march



SUMMARY

- At the same time as its March party preference poll, Republikon asked respondents to what extent they perceive the risk of our country becoming involved in a war as a realistic threat, and whom they hold responsible for the existence of the war.
- The vast majority of respondents (51 percent) believe there is no real danger that Hungary will be drawn into a war, but less than a third of those surveyed believe there is.
- 92 percent of voters of the Tisza party were not swayed by war scare tactics, while pro-government voters are more divided: 60 percent believe the risk of being drawn into a war is very real, one-fifth believe there is no such risk, and another fifth were unable to answer the question.
- Nearly half of respondents hold the Russian aggressor responsible for the fact that the war is still ongoing, while 18 percent blame Ukraine for the conflict dragging on. According to 14 percent, the European Union bears primary responsibility. Based on these findings, it can be said that Russian responsibility is widely accepted, but one-third of voters look elsewhere for those responsible.
- Only 6 percent of Fidesz-KDNP voters blame Russia for the war dragging on. Forty-six percent of supporters of the ruling party hold the Ukrainian defenders responsible, and nearly a third blame the EU for the protracted conflict between the two countries.
- A significant portion of undecided voters cannot make up their minds on the issue of war, but the prevailing view among them is that we are not drifting toward war, and that Russia is to blame for the war's prolongation. Although the current undecided voters can no longer be mobilized en masse in the time remaining, it is clear that Fidesz has less of a reserve in this group.

RESULTS


In the final stretch of the 2026 election campaign, the ruling parties essentially switched their target. Instead of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party, President Zelensky and the Ukrainian people have become the enemy to be defeated in Fidesz's messaging, and the new stakes of the election have become whether to be dragged into war or to stay out of it. The author of The Atlantic [called](#) Fidesz's current campaign "the first truly post-reality political campaign," although Fidesz had already begun its anti-Ukrainian agitation years before the start of the current election campaign. The opinion of Hungarian society, kept in a constant state of war readiness and psychosis, has formed accordingly by the fourth year of the war: in February 2026, for example, one in five Hungarians considered the war raging in Ukraine to be Hungary's most serious problem, ahead of, among other things, the state of the healthcare system.¹ At the same time as its March party preference poll², Republikon asked respondents to what extent they perceive the risk of our country becoming embroiled in a war as a realistic threat, and who they hold responsible for the war. The aim was to determine how effective the ruling parties' war scare tactics have been.




¹ Based on a February survey by Republikon. Available at: https://republikon.hu/elemlzesek,-kutatások/260318_tengernyi-problema.aspx

² Emlékeztetőül: Márciusban 9 százalékponttal vezetett a Tisza a Fidesz-KDNP-vel szemben a biztos szavazó pártválasztók körében. Részletek: https://republikon.hu/elemlzesek,-kutatások/260327_marc-kvk.aspx


According to 51 percent of respondents, there is no real danger that Hungary will be drawn into a war; roughly half that number—27 percent of those surveyed—consider the danger to be real, meaning that the overwhelming majority was not receptive to Fidesz’s message and attempts to instill fear.



Although 92 percent of voters in the Tisza region did not fall prey to war-mongering, 60 percent of pro-government voters believe the danger of being dragged into war is very real. One-fifth of them believe there is no such danger, and another fifth could not answer, meaning the pro-government camp is also divided on the issue. Overall, Fidesz successfully instilled fear in its own camp to mobilize support. A striking 54 percent of the undecided could not answer this question, while the other half of the undecided were divided: 27 percent do not fear that we are drifting into war, while 19 percent do. Overall, the opinion of the undecided leans more toward the opposition’s position, however, the uncertainty caused by war rhetoric has somewhat caught up with this group, as without the ruling parties’ attempts to stir up sentiment, they would have no reason to question whether Hungary, as a member of the EU and NATO, would be able to stay out of the conflict four years after the outbreak of war.



Nearly half of respondents hold the Russian aggressor responsible for the fact that the war is still ongoing, while 18 percent blame Ukraine for the conflict's protracted nature. According to 14 percent, the European Union bears primary responsibility. Based on these findings, it can be said that Russian responsibility is at least widely accepted, but one-third of voters look elsewhere for those responsible.



Only 6 percent of Fidesz-KDNP voters blame Russia for the war dragging on. Forty-six percent of pro-government voters hold the Ukrainians defending their homeland responsible, and nearly a third blame the EU for the protracted conflict between the two countries. Four years after Russia invaded Ukraine, Hungary's neighbor, with only a single-digit percentage of Fidesz voters holding the aggressor responsible, it is hard to question who benefited from the government's war narrative: the willing service of Russian interests. Meanwhile, 88 percent of voters in the Tisza region hold the aggressor responsible for the conflict, despite the fact that Péter Magyar does not take a firm stand in support of Ukraine, although he regularly condemns Russian influence. Essentially, the voter base of both major parties feels that the position of the party they support regarding the Russian-Ukrainian war is their own. Half of those who are undecided remain undecided on this issue as well, but the majority among them believe that Russia and Putin are responsible for the war; 33 percent hold this view, while 8 percent blame the EU and 5 percent blame Ukraine. In this regard, the undecided lean toward the opposition, as is usually the case. It is difficult to imagine that the current undecided voters could be mobilized en masse by any party in the time remaining, and given this group's stance on the war, it is particularly doubtful that the undecided group harbors a mass of "hidden Fidesz" voters. The majority of respondents disagree with the main campaign message of Fidesz-KDNP less than two weeks before the election. It is evident that while pro-government voters are susceptible to fear-mongering on the one hand and share Fidesz's stance on the war on the other, the position represented by the government remains a minority view among the general population. Since January, Fidesz-KDNP has been trying to heighten fears related to the war, which, while unsuccessful for the majority, has unsettled a segment of voters: if not in terms of their election strategy, then certainly regarding their sense of security. Tisza has managed to maintain its lead amid the current "battle noise," but the election race is far from decided. Whether "the first truly groundbreaking political campaign" can overshadow and make people forget the country's very real and palpable decline and the largest opposition party's proposed solutions will become clear in less than two weeks.

Methodology: The survey was conducted via telephone interviews with 1,000 respondents between March 23 and 26, 2026. The survey is representative of the country's adult population in terms of gender, age, educational attainment, and type of settlement. The margin of error is +/- 3.5%.