Party Support

December 2024

R i REPUBLIKON INTÉZET

INTRODUCTION

This autumn, public opinion polls have drawn great attention. The primary reason for this is that for the first time in many years, a single party has managed to surpass the governing parties in popularity. Across the entire research market, it can be stated that the Tisza Party's disadvantage is at least diminishing, and in many cases, its popularity now rivals or even surpasses that of the Fidesz-KDNP coalition. Meanwhile, the government is working overtime to create the financial and material conditions for pre-election spending in 2026, to tarnish the country's reputation with embarrassing diplomatic moves and to craft a communication strategy for the 2026 election campaign. The latter activity saw Fidesz-KDNP testing a new campaign method, which could be most simply described as public agitation: Tamás Menczer was sent to disrupt Péter Magyar's campaign event. Previously, such a task would have been deemed below the rank of a communications director or state secretary. However, recently, senior Fidesz-KDNP and government officials have also been mobilized, traveling across the country and giving interviews. Republikon's December party preference survey was conducted amid this heightened atmosphere, with data collected during and shortly after the Menczer-Magyar encounter.

- In December, the **Tisza Party** overtook **Fidesz-KDNP**. Tisza has 27% support among the total population, while the governing coalition stands at 25%, a 2-point lead for Péter Magyar's party. Last month, Fidesz-KDNP led by two points, but its support has fallen by 1 percentage point, while Tisza gained 3 points, reversing the situation. Among party voters, Tisza leads by three points, with 35% compared to Fidesz-KDNP's 32%. When filtering for likely voters, for the first time, Fidesz-KDNP no longer has the most active supporters, so the Tisza Party has an even more significant 6-point lead among sure party voters, with 37% compared to Fidesz-KDNP's 31%. Although data collection was conducted during and shortly after the Menczer-Magyar encounter, the decline in Fidesz-KDNP's support cannot be attributed solely to this incident. Whatever the cause, the decline is significant, with a 4-point drop among party voters and a 6-point decline among sure voters.

Willingness to participate (%)

| Category	Value
I would definitely go.	60
I would probably go.	16
I would probably not go.	9
I would definitely not go.	11
DK/NA	4

- The third strongest party is **Mi Hazánk**, its support among the total population is 6% (↑1), among party voters and sure party voters it is 8% (↑1). In the changing Hungarian party system, with two competing political formations of similar strength, the role of the other parliamentary parties changes as well, every smaller faction is a potential kingmaker. Given the growing proximity between Mi Hazánk and Fidesz-KDNP this option must not be overlooked.

Party preference (total population %)

TISZA: 27
Fidesz-KDNP: 25
Mi Hazánk: 6
DK: 5
MKKP: 4
Momentum: 3
MSZP: 2
Jobbik: 1
LMP: 1
Párbeszéd: 1
other: 1
Undecided: 24

- **DK** is in the fourth place, its support has been unchanged since October. In every aspect of the analysis, it is 1 percentage point behind Mi Hazánk, 5% of the total population, and 7-7% of party voters and sure party voters would vote for the party. For DK to be kingmaker in the parliament, a Tisza-DK agreement would be needed, which currently seems unlikely, given that Péter Magyar builds his politics upon the opposition against Gyurcsány and Orbán.

- As of now the **Two-Tailed Dog Party** would get into parliament as well. Although we know that their supporters' willingness to vote is historically low, the party is currently on the threshold of entering parliament with 4% support among the total population, 5% among party voters, and 5% (↑2) among sure party voters. Among sure voters, they have strengthened by two percentage points over the past month, placing the Two-Tailed Dog Party in a position to enter parliament. Based on current figures, they could even provide a narrow parliamentary majority for the Tisza Party against a Fidesz-KDNP-Mi Hazánk alliance.

- **Momentum** stands at 3% among the total population, 4% among party voters, and also 4% (↓1) among sure party voters. Currently, it would not get into parliament. The party's visibility has diminished in recent months, but in terms of values and political perspective, it is perhaps the most compatible opposition party with Tisza. Therefore, if it manages to enter parliament, it could hold valuable parliamentary seats in 2026.

Party preference (party voters %)

Party	%
TISZA	35
Fidesz-KDNP	32
Mi Hazánk	8
DK	7
MKKP	5
Momentum	4
MSZP	3
Jobbik	1
LMP	1
Párbeszéd	1
other	1

- **MSZP** is the last party above 1%, its support is unchanged since October: 2% among the total population and 3-3% among party voters and sure party voters.
- **Párbeszéd** and **LMP** are at 1% among the total population, party voters and sure party voters as well.
- **Jobbik** holds 1% support among the total population and party voters, and 2% among sure party voters.
- The proportion of **undecided** voters decreased from 29% to 24% over the past month, with these voters primarily joining the Tisza Party.

Party preference (sure party voters %)

Party	%
TISZA	37
Fidesz-KDNP	31
Mi Hazánk	8
DK	7
MKKP	5
Momentum	4
MSZP	3
Jobbik	2
Párbeszéd	1
LMP	1
other	1

Although Fidesz–KDNP falling to second place is a significant event, the 2026 election is still far off, and many uncertainties remain. One of these is the electoral system. We are aware of the current modification plans, including reducing Budapest's influence, but it is likely that these changes are not final. It would not be unprecedented for the governing parties to amend the election law they themselves wrote, even shortly before the elections, once the opposition has adapted to it, as they did in 2014 and again this year by altering Budapest's electoral system. Another important question is whether Péter Magyar and his party can sustain voter interest for the remaining year and a half until the elections and whether Fidesz–KDNP can achieve its previously renowned mobilization feats in the months leading up to the elections. A third question is whether Tisza's momentum will continue and reach a point where it can win and govern without a coalition partner. This will require not only a strong performance on the party list but also numerous victories by individual candidates who will often face well-established and well-known candidates from the governing parties and other opposition forces as unknowns.

Methodology: The research was conducted through telephone interviews with 1,000 respondents between November 28 and December 5, 2024. The sample is representative of the adult population of the country by gender, age, education level, and settlement type. The margin of error is ±3.2%.