By the 2022 elections, a tentative bloc formation within the Fidesz opposition had begun, and after the election failure, the opposition cooperation fragmented again. In a previous analysis by Republikon Institute, we showed that opposition voters voted in roughly equal proportions for the opposition coalition as a whole and for the common list because of their party's participation. Hence, the previous assumption that the conceptually opposition voter has emerged is only partially true. On the basis of their worldview and political values, those voting for the opposition form a heterogeneous group, what they only have in common is the rejection of the Orbán regime.
In the last part of our series on opposition voters, we are comparing different opposition groups with respect to their ideological self-identification. We are primarily interested in how consistent opposition voters’ policy expectations and political preferences are in light of their ideological self-classification. The significance of the topic is that ideological self-identification may be more stable than party preference, especially in the context of the Hungarian opposition landscape that has been in constant flux since 2010.
The complete analysis is availabe HERE.
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