Republikon Institute held a conference on 15th April 2025 titled “The Prospects of Liberal Politics in an Illiberal World” where a number of interesting insights and debates were generated on where we go from here as liberals.
The first panel
In the first, international panel, four liberal political figures discussed the topic at hand: Ailbhe (Alva) Finn, Executive Director of the European Liberal Forum (ELF); Katalin Cseh, former Hungarian member of the European Parliament; Jeannette Baljeu, Dutch member of the EP and member of the conservative-liberal party VVD (People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy); and Jan-Christoph Oetjen, German member of the EP and member of the German liberal party FDP. Zoltán Ranschburg, Republikon’s political analyst coordinated the panel.
First, the participants reflected briefly on the position of liberal politics in their own countries. Oetjen noted of Germany that the far-right had had a historic surge in the recent election, whilst FDP lost; however, he was optimistic that there would be a liberal comeback in the future, liberals just have to work to meet the population’s expectations. Baljeu said that the Netherlands was still a liberal country overall, but that the liberal VVD has to cooperate with the PVV (Party for Freedom) in parliament, a nationalist, right-wing populist party founded and led by Geert Wilders. Finn emphasized that the task of the European Liberal Forum at this moment was to do better politics and make sure that liberalism had a future; in order to do this, liberals have to have a universal answer to the right-wing nationalist vision of the world. Lastly, Katalin Cseh reflected on the Hungarian state of affairs: the role of her party, Momentum, in her view is to help deliver regime change whilst standing up for liberal values and ensuring that what comes after the Orbán-regime incorporates liberalism.
In the next question round, the central issue was the “cordon sanitaire” and the far-right threat. Baljeu said that the cordon sanitaire did not work, and instead we needed to be working on different ways to unmask the populist right, but added that every country was going to be different in this regard. (After her answer, she had to leave to catch her flight.) Oetjen agreed that context matters: in the EP, working towards consensus makes sense, but it might not in a country like France, for example, where the far-right has already become powerful. In this context, it might then be better to leave the far-right to it, so to speak, and let them demonstrate their incompetence on their own. He added that human rights are things that we cannot compromise on, so liberals cannot cooperate with parties that fundamentally disrespect human rights. Finn also insisted that liberals cannot simply mirror far-right narratives; we need something aligned with our values but also convincing, and we must not forget that economic freedom is just as important as human rights. Katalin Cseh added that democracy backsliding is not a Hungary-specific issue and that a lot of people have overestimated the resilience of democracy and liberalism.
Next, Zoli’s question concerned the relationship between liberalism and the future of Europe. Finn highlighted that the EPP might be moving towards the right, which constitutes a challenge for the future of European politics; given this, the ELF is attempting to play the level-headed, centrist figure in European politics. Oetjen added that as liberals, we are not being outspoken enough about the vision we have for the EU; people do not care about the nitty-gritty stuff, and we are at a crossroads where we have to be bold and visionary in order to present the vision of a stronger, more coordinated Europe. Katalin Cseh emphasized that while EU citizens mostly highlight the convenience aspects of living in the EU such as not having to carry a passport when crossing the border, the EU is actually the safest and most democratic place in the entire world. She insists that we as European liberals can assume leadership in these new times based on our values and economic strength as the world’s largest single market. In order to do so, however, we need a radically new vision of Europe, and we also need to do away with the need for unanimity.
Lastly, Zoli asked if there was anything in the illiberal playbook that liberals could use. Katalin Cseh said that understanding people’s fears and anxieties, building from the ground up is very important; the European mainstream has to understand that it is entirely understandable for people to want safety and security, which is why they end up voting for populist parties that promise them these things. Oetjen added that liberals should not copy illiberals, but that we need to be emotional rather than overly rational or technocratic, we need to give people hope and build on positive emotions. Finn agreed, saying that illiberals often have a much braver communications strategy than liberals do; she added, ‘we need to create our own Joe Rogan podcast’.
The second panel
The second panel was in Hungarian and concerned the domestic political context. The panellists included Éva Sebők, an MP for the liberal party Momentum; Zoltán Ranschburg, Republikon’s political analyst mentioned above; Bálint Magyar, sociologist, former member of the liberal party SZDSZ, former Minister of Education; and Zoltán Somogyi, sociologist, businessman, also former member of SZDSZ. The panel was coordinated by Gábor Horn, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Republikon.
First, the panellists reflected on their personal relationship to liberalism as well as the meaning of liberalism more broadly. Sebők said that the 15-18% support for liberalism based on people’s self-identification as liberal probably won’t increase in Hungary because state socialism ruined the soul of the Hungarian nation which has since been seeking an authority figure. According to her, liberals have not been able to offer such a paternalistic authority figure, but that is not necessarily a problem. Zoli added that there are different types of liberals, which was also shown by Republikon’s own studies: some can be categorized as human rights liberals, others as economic liberals, and yet others as self-identified liberals, and these groups do not have a significant overlap. The problem in Hungary, though, is that Fidesz has defined liberalism for its own voters; put another way, liberals have let Fidesz define liberalism without offering a competing definition. Magyar argued that the reason behind the marginalization of liberalism in Hungary has been that liberal organizations have not had a societal vision or a political strategy, they have merely tried to call society to account for liberal values. He added that if we as liberals don’t overcome our need to be morally superior, we can only sustain the current culture of complaining. According to Somogyi, the government’s anti-liberalism should be understood as an opportunity for liberals; he added that the stronger the market economy, the more we can defend ourselves against state power, and the more expansive human rights will become as well.
Sebők continued, saying that we need individual responsibility and the recognition of the importance of individual freedoms in Hungary, but that the past 30 years have not given society the level of confidence needed for these to come to fruition. According to her, the education system has not prioritized these values in the past 30 years, which is why people are willing to sacrifice their liberties and responsibilities to an alarming degree. Gábor Horn disagreed, saying that the lack of civic development in Hungary is not the result of the past 30 years, but the past 15 years. Somogyi, responding to Sebők, said that the current opposition is unfortunately only visible in Budapest, and has not opened its doors for people to become party members, which has also contributed to the failure of liberalism to engage large swaths of the population. Sebők argued that the opposition is active all over the country, but that independent media is fundamentally Budapest-based, and only occasionally covers affairs of the country, which limits the extent to which opposition parties’ activities outside Budapest are visible through media.
Magyar also had qualms with Sebők’s arguments: he said that the problem is not that liberal values are not taught in schools because the Orbán-regime created patron—client relationships by force all over the country. He criticized Momentum, arguing that the party does not reach precisely those that Sebők thinks should be reached by the opposition. He added that the majority of liberals are planning on voting for Péter Magyar, and that the average voter is more worried about whether they would have access to public work than the right of assembly, and unfortunately Momentum does not currently have an answer to the previous problem.
Lastly, to bring the heated party-political debate to an end, Gábor Horn asked: what should we do now, as liberals? Zoli, adding to the previous discussion, argued that the bridge occupations currently being organized and coordinated by Momentum do not have a stated goal, that is true, but regime change does not depend on Momentum. Magyar agreed, but insisted that the Dog Party, for example, has a much more peaceable strategy towards cooperation with the Tisza Party, while Momentum seems to be precluding future cooperation with them. Gábor added that the force of the protests could be felt by the small-town voter as well even when they are not directly affected by the restriction of the right of assembly. Somogyi defended Momentum, saying that when a party is at 2% support, they will understandably take advantage of the current situation and show that they still have relevance, otherwise they would have no chance of surviving as a party. However, he also thinks that the parliamentary opposition assists Fidesz’s power. As for the future of liberal politics, he said that a Hungarian liberal party could coalesce around a specific policy issue, or try to address the employees and owners of SMEs (small and medium enterprises) who have suffered under Fidesz due to the unpredictability of the entrepreneurial environment. In any case, there is no current Hungarian liberal party which has a political strategy or any degree of consistency. Sebők, responding to the criticisms, said that they can only cooperate with those willing to cooperate; and that for her as an MP, the important thing is that she represents the causes she finds important and takes responsibility for the things that she can influence.
The operation of Republikon Institute is supported by the European Union. The views and opinions expressed at the event do not necessarily reflect that of the European Union. Neither the European Union, nor the organisation providing support can be made responsible for these.
