Report: Divisive memory - Our national symbols and history in politics

 
 
Mar
21.

Report: Divisive memory - Our national symbols and history in politics

Republikon Intézet
 

On 20 March, Republikon Institute organised a conference entitled Divisive memory: Our national symbols and history in politics. The event was opened by Gábor Horn, Chairman of the Institute's Board of Trustees, who briefly reflected on the question of whether or not the concept of the nation can be appropriated, in the light of Viktor Orbán's speech on 15 March on cleaning out “bugs” from the country.

Then the panel discussion between our invited guests began, moderated by Andrea Virág, the strategic director of Republikon.

Péter Csunderlik, historian, professor at the Humanities Department of ELTE in Budapest, started the discussion by stating that national holidays are unthinkable without national symbols. Every nation has a founding anthem, 15 March is a symbol of this, and every nation has national symbols, which politics likes to appropriate. On the necessity of the divisive nature of symbols, he said that the struggle over them had already begun in '48: the political work of Kossuth's reformers clashed here with the activities of the radical youth of Pest on March 15. Politics is always transforming and shaping national symbols, and politicians shape them in their own image. Csunderlik points out that there are basically two directions in the interpretation of the legacy of '48 in today's Hungary: one is the emphasis on the struggle for independence, the other is that on social rights and institutions, the latter also emphasised by Péter Magyar. In his opinion, Orbán's appropriation of the Kokárda was perhaps the worst political gesture in Hungary in the period after the regime change; it was then that Orbán began to participate in the Kossuth-cult too. The lesson of Orbán's and Magyar's success is that the country belongs to those who can make people believe that they represent the nation. It has been the case in Hungary since the 19th century that the main fault line is between 'westerners' and 'sovereignist nationalists', but now the situation is different in that it is national against national, and as a result a party system could emerge that is more right-wing than even the Polish system.

Veronika Kövesdi, Research Associate at the Institute of Political Science of the HUN-REN Research Centre for Social Sciences, highlighted that the nation is a discursive construct, thus it plays a major role in self-definition and in determining our thoughts. Accordingly, since the '48 War of Independence is an essential element of contemporary Hungarian politics, the way politicians relate to it plays an important role in their self-definition, and they select the values and enemy images they need in current political struggles. As for Péter Magyar's and Viktor Orbán's approach to the politics of memory, she stressed that while Magyar builds on Petőfi's legacy, emphasising that patriotism connects him and his camp with the fight for freedom, Orbán emphasises precisely those who are anti-patriotic and that these people (the bugs) must be eliminated. The Tisza Party is thus increasingly identified with a sense of patriotism. On the different memories of 15 March and 23 October, she pointed out that while the former has a unified memory, the latter is too recent, with a divided memory, because many people who lived through the events of that time are still alive.

Ágnes Patakfalvi-Czirják, anthropologist and sociologist, assistant professor at the Department of Communication and Sociology at the BME Faculty of Arts, also emphasized the malleability of national symbols and emblems, their diversity of interpretation, because everyone feels differently when they see them, pick them up, or pin them up. The institutional system teaches a basis on how to use them, but in fact these symbols are constantly changing. Narratives can also adapt to local needs, so a symbol will be widely used and understood if the threshold for access is low and easily accessible, and a politician's job is to make national events as transparent as possible for the average person. Patakfalvi-Czirják agreed with Veronika Kövesdi's assessment that Orbán and Magyar had formulated two very different concepts of the nation on 15 March, with the former going for exclusion (see the ban on dual citizens). She also underlined that to build community and identity, you need cathartic moments, emotional engagement, and this is how you can create a crowd, as Péter Magyar does. Regarding 23 October, she added that its symbols (e.g. the flag with holes) have not become nationally defining, so it is less of a tangible, emotional experience than 15 March.

Finally, Krisztián Nyáry, writer, literary historian and communication expert, first spoke about the fact that Hungarian identity was not based on language or religion; for example, in 1823 the offer of the hymn was not yet convincing because there was not enough cohesive force among the diverse population, but by ‘48 the idea of Hungarianness had already gained acceptance, which is how the National Song could become defining. It was an intellectual construct that had to be built. ‘48-49 then accelerated the formation of national identity: whereas in the reform era (1830-1848) the system of symbols had still been elitist, by dualism (1867-1914) a kind of universal system developed. He stressed that there was always an official interpretation of ‘48 and other national events, alongside an “underground” interpretation accessible to a wider public. Nyáry was critical of the leftists of the 2000s, who allowed Orbán to appropriate the kokárda and who stopped wearing it. In contrast, he said, Péter Magyar's approach to the politics of remembrance was a significant step forward. In addition, although the bloody ‘56 was less able to develop into a national celebration than the peaceful ‘48, the left has completely abandoned the legacy of ‘56, making it a kind of right-wing privilege, which he says is an unacceptable intellectual failure on the part of the former. We must not let go of symbols, because they can return at any time, and we do not know how strong they will be, what message they will convey.

Eu Co Funded En

The operation of Republikon Institute is supported by the European Union. The views and opinions expressed at the event do not necessarily reflect that of the European Union. Neither the European Union, nor the organisation providing support can be made responsible for these. 

 

 
 
 
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