Opening speach: Gábor Horn
To the Right? – Zoltán Ranschburg
The presentation focused on the 2024 EP election results, with the key question being the true significance of the apparent rise of the far right. While the clear losers of the elections were the green and liberal parties, this does not reflect a European-level decline of liberalism, as the shrinking of the liberal political groups is due only to the parties of four member states. As for the system-critical, sovereigntist, right-wing parties, the Patriots for Europe and the Europe of Sovereign Nations, which replaced the former ID group – although they boast significant memberships, and 14 out of the 19 parties affiliated with these groups grew since the previous elections – they will continue to face obstacles from the cordon sanitaire of the centrist groups, and internal disagreements inherent to their nature will also likely hinder the implementation of their agenda.
Are you ready, Europe? – Krisztina Arató
The second presentation outlined the internal and external challenges that the EU faces. Among the external factors, Krisztina Arató mentioned Donald Trump’s presidency, which makes the transatlantic relations unpredictable and confrontative, mostly in the areas of trade, security and energy. Regarding the Russia-Ukraine war, the presenter highlighted the fact that the EU missed an opportunity to take a firm stand against aggression and thereby define itself in opposition to it. A further external challenge is posed by the fact that the relations with China are shifting towards more confrontation instead of cooperation, and the migration crisis is still generating serious political tensions between member states. On the internal level, the dominant challenges are economic in nature, and according to the Draghi report, they are characterized by declining competitiveness, overregulation, and the shrinking of the EU’s presence in the global economy; the report proposes more investment and closer cooperation to remedy these issues. In the defense policy area, member states remain divided, and with the rise of eurosceptic parties the rift between supranationalists and supporters of the "Europe of Nations" concept is deepening. The conclusion highlighted that the EU must respond more flexibly to these problems, as the traditional economic and legal responses currently overshadow political solutions, while no one is willing to change the EU’s founding treaties.
Paneldiscussion
Péter Techet discussed Austrian politics, specifically last September’s national elections. The elections were won by FPÖ, the Freedom Party of Austria, which secured 29% of the vote. Their most important campaign themes were Covid-19 closures and vaccines, pf which they were critical, and which were primarily brought into politics by Herbert Kickl, the leader of FPÖ, as well as migration. Second place was secured by the ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party), while the SPÖ (Social Democratic Party of Austria) came in third, building on left-wing ʽclass war’ rhetoric. The Greens lost seats while the liberal NEOS was able to gain seats. After the elections, the ÖVP, the SPÖ and the NEOS began to negotiate about forming a government, but due to fundamental disagreements, the coalition fell apart. President Van der Bellen then asked Herbert Kickl to form a government. Surprisingly, the ÖVP agreed to form a government with the FPÖ, even though the party had, up to that point, portrayed Kickl as a national security risk. The negotiations are ongoing, the new government could form by mid-February; however, it is clear that Austria will have a far-right Chancellor. Techet said of the background of the elections that political polarisation had been getting particularly bad in Austria: while the SPÖ had become more radical with their ‘class war’ rhetoric, the FPÖ moved further right, becoming a ‘class warrior’ in their own right by addressing and representing upper-class interests. The FPÖ did not move towards the middle, but the other parties also did not put up a “cordon sanitaire” against them. A debate developed between the panellists about whether a radical party has to move towards the political middle in order to be successful, and whether this necessarily leads to moderation. Techet argues, based on the Austrian elections, that moving towards the middle is not necessary for a broad voter base, and that it also does not guarantee the moderation of radical ideology and rhetoric. Even though Austria is a rich country, the ire towards the elite is tangible, and the narrative about migration is well-placed to take advantage of this. According to Techet, the most important question is what to do about modernity.
Anita Szűcs discussed the French early elections in 2024. According to her, France is at a historical crossroads, finding itself ahead of a constitutional crisis or a crisis of values; as a result of the elections, the French parliament became tripartite, which is unprecedented in the country. The far-right National Rally sets the agenda and the political programme; the party was able to increase its mandate from 8 in 2022 to 126 in 2024. The most mandates were won by the party family representing four left-wing parties (New Popular Front); this is the party family of the Mélenchon-led radical left-wing party as well. Macron’s party, the Renaissance, came second, while the Le Pen- and Jordan Bardella-led National Rally came third, and the right-wing/conservative group came fourth. It is from this last group that Macron chose the new head of government. The parliament, however, is weak, no one can form a majority. Macron decided that early elections would be held in France after the European Parliamentary elections which brought the victory of radical parties, which in turn caused a legitimacy crisis. Szűcs pointed out internal and external reasons for the political crisis in France. Among internal reasons, she mentioned Le Pen’s and Bardella’s powerful move towards the middle, and their nostalgic, anti-republican, antiliberal, antimodernist narrative which has proven to be quite successful. Among the external reasons, she primarily emphasized the new phase of modernity marked by mass consumption, to which other parties cannot give an answer. According to Szűcs, there are two distinct paths for far-right parties once in power: moderation (Meloni), or destruction of democratic institutions (Bardella). She thinks that the solution would be if the pro-modernist left- and right-wing forces had a viable, intelligible recipe for the challenges of consumer society.
Gergely Prőhle analysed the German elections – he highlighted that these are particularly significant for the question of global, European, and Hungarian economic competitiveness. Prőhle emphasized that the problems of the German economy stem from its so-called “three-way dependency”: dependency on security (USA), energy (USSR/Russia), and trade (China). The mixture of cheap energy and modern technology, which is the result of Russia’s and Germany’s cooperation, is the guarantor of the safety and development of the whole of Europe. Germany’s economic vulnerability became clear, however, during Covid-19, when Chinese firms started to buy up family businesses in Germany, gaining access to key innovations. Due to the Russia—Ukraine war, energy provision was lost, and the rise of green ideology led to the shutdown of nuclear power plants and the transition to renewable energy sources, but in the given political-economic situation, this was not feasible. Germany therefore has been in recession for two years, and due to the political thematization of migration, the belief in societal integration was ultimately shaken. According to Prőhle, the voter base of the far-right AfD is around 20-22% country-wide, but the CDU’s (Christian Democratic Union of Germany) move towards the left, economic and social problems, and international vulnerability meant that the AfD was able to build a much larger societal base. Meanwhile, the CDU led by Friedrich Merz is attempting to engage in hard-line social politics intended to attract AfD supporters – whether this is successful will be seen on the 23rd of February. On the topic of the far-right moving towards the middle, Prőhle believes that the involvement of radical parties in governance is by far the most successful strategy. As the example of Orbán shows, one cannot obtain majority based on “right-wing values” in Europe, only with allies such as by addressing Christian-national or far-right voters. He thinks that the “cordon sanitaire” has not been successful anywhere; moreover, the “no-go” zones in societal dialogue encouraged by the left have made intelligent discourse impossible.
Finally, Zoltán Bretter talked about the cancelled Romanian presidential election and its political background. He highlighted the conspiracy theories spreading on TikTok and other social media sites, and the importance of Romanian Protochronism, which imagines an idealized Romanian past based on linguistic, archaeological, and historical theories of questionable credibility. Protochronism had many followers between the two World Wars among the members of the nationalist and anti-Hungarian Iron Guard, and it was revived by Ceausescu in the 70s in the form of a unique “natio-Stalinism”. Finally, it unexpectedly showed up in the campaign of Calin Georgescu who won the (now annulled) presidential election last year. According to Bretter, polls estimated Georgescu’s popularity at around 3% - his victory shook Romania fundamentally, causing an identity crisis and chaos. The parliamentary elections held after the presidential election saw a pro-Europe coalition form against Georgescu, which then fell apart right after the formation of the government. At the moment, the government consists of the PSD (Social Democratic Party), the PNL (National Liberal Party), and the UDMR (Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania). According to Bretter, the countries discussed by the panellists are similar in that they are politically polarized. Relatedly, he commented: it was the conviction of Hitler and Goebbels that the political middle had to be emptied, and people had to be forced to make a moral choice. He added that “digi-democracy” or, more accurately, “infocracy” produced a situation in which social media-based subcultures are self-galvanizing, and Russian geopolitical interests find a fertile soil in this environment, as the example of the annulled presidential election in Romania shows.
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