Introduction
Republikon Institute held a conference on 26th February titled “The Sky Above Berlin” where ex-member of the European Parliament, István Szent-Iványi, and director of Nézőpont Intézet, Ágoston Sámuel Mráz, discussed the recent German election.
First, our Institute’s senior analyst, Zoltán Ranschburg demonstrated the election results and drew the audience’s attention to its most important aspects. It is clear from German voters’ problem map that migration and the economy far surpass the significance of all other problems, so the campaign was primarily about these two issues as well as parties’ attitudes towards AfD. Importantly, CDU tried to tighten the rules of immigration in January with the support of AfD, which caused major political backlash, with Olaf Scholz (SPD) building the rest of his campaign on this issue. Left-wing party Die Linke came out positively from the scandal: building on the “Nazi threat”, they managed to address a lot of young people through TikTok, primarily due to the passionate orations of parliamentary group leader Heidi Reichinnek.
Assessing elections results
First, Ágoston Mráz thought it important to note that CDU performed surprisingly badly for itself: the psychological boundary for the party was 30% but it only managed to get 28,5% of the votes. He thought Linke’s campaign was professional, the topic of a wealth tax and Heidi Reichinnek’s personality were able to attract a lot of young people through TikTok. He added that AfD won practically all of East-Germany – and 24% of the mandates –, which means that it has become a people’s party. István Szent-Iványi considered the high turnout rate to be important too: at 83%, it is the highest since 1990, which also contributed to the popularity of AfD because 1,8 million people voted for this party who had not voted in the previous election. Similarly to Mráz, he emphasized: there are two countries here, East-Germany in blue (AfD) and West-Germany in black (CDU/CSU). Szent-Iványi also highlighted age: amongst 18- to 30-year-olds, AfD won, followed by Linke, while in 2021 the Green Party and FDP were the most popular in this age range.
Mráz then moved on to discuss future expectations. There is probably going to be a coalition between CDU/CSU and SPD with the two parties’ 52% altogether, which means they won’t have to include the Greens in the government. The debt brake will still be a problem, but until the new government’s inauguration on the 25th of March, the 2/3 constitutional majority can enact a debt brake reform. Afterwards, the government coalition will not be able to do this alone because they won’t have a constitutional majority in the Bundestag. Szent-Iványi added that this was CDU’s second-worst election result since its inception (the worst being in 2021). Plus, Linke’s return is surprising given BSW’s exit from the party a year ago which had seemed to suggest the end of the party. As a conclusion, he said that Linke and AfD will be destructive forces for the government since they are not planning to cooperate. AfD, BSW and Linke received a third of the votes altogether which, in the long run, is risky for German democracy, but the Greens representing the consolidated opposition means that they can get stronger as such. He added of the debt brake issue that both Merz and SPD want to reform the institution: the former to raise military spending, the latter to increase social allowances.
Mráz thinks that it is up to Alice Weidel now to make AfD coalition-ready, which means she has to do away with the radicals within her party. She cannot do this from the middle since that is a space already occupied by CDU, so she will adopt radical language to combat radicals. Szent-Iványi agreed: he thinks Weidel will follow the path of Le Pen and Meloni. He added that Weidel has a serious task ahead of her in combatting in-party radicals because AfD had formerly cooperated on the local level with openly neo-Nazi organisations.
Germany and the EU
According to Szent-Iványi, we can expect a stable German government with Friedrich Merz being pro-Europe, Atlanticist, and pro-Ukraine, and unafraid to take on Trump as well. He thinks Europe can breathe more easily now because in a geopolitical storm, we need a proper captain. Mráz agrees: according to him, Scholz was not a good Chancellor in the arena of European politics, Merz will probably be more active on this front. He also highlighted the importance of Merz’s biography: a member of the European Parliament until 1994, he’s still well-connected in Europe, which could mean a “Weimarization” in the sense of renewed French—German—Polish relationships.
German—American relationships and the Russia—Ukraine war
Szent-Iványi drew attention to the fact that the relationship between Trump and Merz will not be conflict-free. US tariffs on the auto industry will primarily concern Germany, but Merz seems strong-willed on this front as well, and European leaders will hopefully line up behind him, which would contribute to the realization of the strategic autonomy that Macron had wanted as well. For the Trump administration, neither Ukraine nor Europe is a priority, so Europe has to present a united front on these issues. Mráz disagrees here, thinking that we need to start with Merz’s biography once again: due to his Atlanticist background, he is connected to every big corporation, and considers the stabilization of the German economy a top priority. Even though the German political elite is anti-Trump, Merz is seemingly open to negotiating and cooperating with the US, and Trump is a businessman, so even though he’d announced the tariffs on the auto industry, in reality this pressurization should be interpreted as a negotiation tactic. Mráz also called attention to the US’s China-focused foreign policy: the goal is to drive a wedge between Russia and China, and this includes a friendlier economic relationship between Europe and Russia, which is why peace in the Russia—Ukraine war is important. Szent-Iványi disagrees with this analysis, but says that if this is indeed the case, it is a mistaken tactic because Putin is an untrustworthy ally.
Germany and Hungary
Mráz believes that Orbán and Weidel’s meet-up was important in building the Patriots for Europe EP group – according to Orbán, AfD could join within a year –, but Orbán also said that “inter-state relationships are the most important”, which they understood in Berlin: Orbán is open towards Merz. The German elite will attempt to cooperate with Hungary within this new constellation of power; this will be made easier by the Greens’ absence from the government this time who Orbán had been most bothered by previously. Besides, the next few years are going to be about arming Europe which Orbán had already started years ago in Hungary. Szent-Iványi, on the other hand, thinks that the Weidel press release was not a good idea because it was provocative and Berlin will have noted this down, much like Orbán’s positive relationship with Trump. Plus, he thinks the Hungarian government clearly does not want to cooperate since according to their own catchphrase, their goal is to “occupy Brussels”. The pragmatic interest – the Hungarian economy’s dependence on the German economy – would dictate cooperation, but the Hungarian government has not made a political gesture towards Merz. But Mráz says that Orbán’s invocation of Brussels was merely a response to being attacked by Manfred Weber, ex-Vice President of CSU, last autumn when he’d expressed that Orbán’s government needs to fall. Orbán, according to Mráz, reacted to this by cooperating with AfD according to the logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”.
Co-funded by the European Union. Views and opinions expressed are however those of the author(s) only and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Union. Neither the European Union nor the granting authority can be held responsible for them.
The event was supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation.
