The past summer was politically more eventful than usual. Hungary’s first double election shook the political status quo, while the Tisza Party was preoccupied with building a background organization that matched its political weight. Meanwhile, Hungary’s rotating EU presidency began, coinciding with a series of foreign and economic policy kamikaze actions by the Hungarian government. International politics continue to be dominated by two parallel devastating wars, and the whole world is keenly watching the U.S. presidential election—some hoping for salvation, others fearing a deepening of global instability.
The autumn political season is just as exciting. The new local governments have taken office, and the Budapest General Assembly is under special scrutiny, having become a battleground for parties with national ambitions. While Tisza is trying to organize itself, the other opposition parties are employing various strategies to stay afloat, and Fidesz seems to have switched to panic mode—rolling out new messages and policy proposals while clearly beginning its campaign for 2026. Their revamped communication strategy hints at Brussels, a new Cold War, a puppet government led by Magyar, sovereign economic policies, and promises of substantial financial handouts, all backed by a national consultation.
It is in this atmosphere that Republikon's monthly public opinion poll returns, conducted a week after October 23. Given Orbán Balázs’s memorable remarks and the intense political discourse surrounding the national holiday, the survey’s findings may be of particular interest. The results are presented below.
In October, Tisza caught up with the governing parties, with Fidesz-KDNP leading within the margin of error. Among the total population, the race stands at 24-26, while among party supporters, the governing party holds a 2-percentage-point lead, with Tisza at 34% and Fidesz-KDNP at 36%. When considering voter turnout willingness—meaning among committed voters—the gap narrows to just 1 percentage point, with Fidesz-KDNP leading 37-36. Since the election, Péter Magyar’s party has clearly reduced its deficit, while Fidesz has lost support according to most public opinion polls. Naturally, the governing party tends to be at its weakest between elections, but it cannot afford to become complacent, as it won the June double election by only 10 percentage points against a young but highly popular party.
Despite the "flood" of the Tisza Party, the rest of the opposition cannot be written off, as several formations still reach the parliamentary threshold in October. Mi Hazánk is the second strongest opposition party, with 5% support among the total population, 7% among party supporters, and 8% among committed voters. This would secure its entry into parliament, and if Fidesz-KDNP’s current position were to weaken, it could become a potential coalition partner for the governing parties. While there is no clear effort toward this yet, cooperation between the two parties on specific issues is becoming increasingly frequent.
The Democratic Coalition (DK) is practically neck and neck with Mi Hazánk, trailing slightly behind, with 5% support among the total population and 7% among both party supporters and committed voters. Although the party has won local government seats, in terms of national support and its performance in the European Parliament elections, it is one of the biggest losers of 2024. At the beginning of the year, it was the strongest opposition party. Nevertheless, it currently meets the parliamentary threshold, meaning it still has ambitions for 2026.
Momentum has 3% support among the total population, 4% among party supporters, and 5% among committed voters. This puts it on the edge of the parliamentary threshold, but Tisza has significantly eroded its voter base, meaning it will be fighting for survival in 2026. As the only liberal party, it may have a unique message and voter base to capitalize on, which could be enough to surpass the threshold.
The Two-Tailed Dog Party (MKKP) is in a delicate position. It leads Momentum by 1 percentage point among the total population and party supporters, standing at 4% and 5%, respectively. However, when looking at committed voters, it once again faces the challenge of voter turnout: only 3% of its supporters are certain voters. Historically, MKKP has seen lower actual election turnout compared to pre-election polling. Based on party support, it would make it into parliament, but factoring in turnout willingness, it falls short of the threshold.
MSZP and Párbeszéd ran together with DK in the June 2024 election, but they have since distanced themselves from each other. MSZP has 2% support among the total population and 3% among both party supporters and committed voters, meaning it would not enter parliament. However, in terms of committed voters, it is approaching the Two-Tailed Dog Party. Since Tisza is at most a centrist party but not left-wing, both DK and MSZP may attempt to attract voters with a stronger left-wing identity. Párbeszéd stands at 1% across all voter categories, meaning it would not be able to retain its parliamentary faction in 2026. However, in Budapest, it has the mayoral position and assembly mandates, securing at least some success in the municipal elections.
Jobbik also has 1% support across the board. Despite currently holding a significant parliamentary faction, it did not perform well in the June election. Both its successor parties and Tisza have fragmented its voter base.
LMP stands at 1% among the total population and party supporters but falls below 1% among committed voters. It performed well in the Budapest elections, but its national position is weak. With Antal Csárdi's departure, the party's parliamentary faction will soon cease to exist. Its 2024 election strategy and Fidesz-KDNP’s last-minute gamble—pulling Alexandra Szentkirályi in favor of Dávid Vitézy—did not help its support.
The proportion of undecided voters is 29%. Understandably, voter turnout willingness is lower than in surveys conducted before or immediately after the election.
Currently, the competition between Fidesz-KDNP and Tisza defines Hungarian public life. However, smaller opposition parties also have a strong chance of securing parliamentary seats in 2026. Since the strongest opposition party has attracted a diverse voter base as a broad-tent party, smaller parties with a more distinct ideological profile may have gained significance. Left-wing voters could help DK or even MSZP secure a parliamentary faction, liberals may rally behind Momentum, the far right has Mi Hazánk, and anti-establishment and anti-party votes could potentially give the Two-Tailed Dog Party its first parliamentary faction.
At the beginning of our October survey, we asked respondents about their ideological affiliation, which may have positively influenced support for more ideologically distinct parties. The results related to ideology will be published in a separate analysis.
Methodology: The research was conducted through telephone interviews with 1,000 respondents between October 24-29, 2024. The survey is representative of the adult population in Hungary based on gender, age, education level, and settlement type. Margin of error: +/- 3.2%.
The following research is available by this link
Party preferences, 2024, Tisza, Fidesz, DK